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 LEXISNEXIS SUMMARY: 
 ... Professor Kai Ambos in his observations on the Bemba confirmation decision emphasized that the inter-
pretation of the notion of dolus eventualis by the Pre-Trial Chamber "is by no means the only one" and that 
"there are other more cognitive concepts of dolus eventualis requiring awareness or certainty as to the con-
sequence" and "these may indeed be included in Article 30." 4.1.  ... The Pre-Trial Chamber found it neces-
sary to distinguish between two types of scenarios regarding the degree of probability of the occurrence of 
the consequence from which intent can be inferred: 
 
 Firstly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is substantial (that is, 
there is a likelihood that it "will occur in the ordinary course of events"), the fact that the suspect 
accepts the idea of bringing about the objective elements of the crime can be inferred from: (i) 
the awareness by the suspect of the substantial likelihood that his or her actions or omissions 
would result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime; and (ii) the decision by the 
suspect to carry out his or her actions or omissions despite such awareness.  ... The Freiburg 
Draft of 1996 In the same manner, the 1996 Freiburg Draft prepared by a working group of the 
Siracusa Committee presented a general rule on mens rea.  ... Germany In the German legal 
system dolus eventualis occurs in situations in which the offender does not aim for the materi-
alization of the elements of the offense or does not foresee the fulfilment of the elements as 
virtually certain but he or she considers it to be possible.  ... The BGH went on drawing the 
lines between bedingter Vorsatz or dolus eventualis and bewusster Fahrlassigkeit or conscious 
negligence, assuring that the perpetrator who trusts in the non-occurrence of the undesired re-
sult is merely acting with conscious negligence and not with dolus eventualis.  ... The estab-
lished jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recog-
nizes different degrees of mental states other than the one of actual intent, or, using the lan-
guage of Lubanga PTC I, dolus directus of the first degree, to trigger the criminal responsibility 
of intentional crimes. 
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HIGHLIGHT: Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides a general definition 
for the mental element required to trigger the criminal responsibility of individuals for serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law. At first sight, it appears that the explicit words of Article 30 are sufficient to put 
an end to a long-lasting debate regarding the mens rea enigma that has confronted the jurisprudence of the 
two ad hoc Tribunals for the last decade, but this is not true. Recent decisions rendered by the International 
Criminal Court evidence the discrepancy among the ICC Pre-Trial Chambers in interpreting the exact mean-
ing of Article 30 of the ICC Statute. The paper challenges that dolus eventualis is one of the genuine and 
independent pillars of criminal responsibility that forms, on its own, the basis of intentional crimes, and sug-
gests its inclusion in the legal standard of Article 30 of the ICC Statute. 
 
Q. Prosecutor: Suppose that a high ranking military officer gets two conflicting opinions from 
different legal advisers in an equally high position in the ministry of defense. The first advises 
him that he may continue with his conduct while the other says he may not, then which advice 
does he abide by? 
 
A. Defence: In such a case he can act no longer at all, because his attention has been drawn to 
the difference in the legal opinions. If he continues with performing the act and does it at his 
own risk, then in that risk he committed a wrong. In other words, if he acts, he acts on what is 
known in the Roman law as "dolus eventualis", an evil intention. 
 
Q. Prosecutor: . . . this is a new and startling legal theory. Did you understand that? 
 
A. Defence: Yes I understood. 
 
Presiding Judge: Well, we have your position.  n1 
 
 
 TEXT: 
 [*434]  1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In January 2007, in the Lubanga case,  n2 Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court ruled that 
Article 30 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) encompasses the three de-
grees of dolus, namely, dolus directus of the first and second degrees and dolus eventualis. More recently, in 
September 2008 in the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui case,  n3 the Defense for the first accused contended 
that the Statute does not include the notion of dolus eventualis.  n4 The Defense relied heavily on scholarly 
opinions in support of its submission. Faced by such a legal dilemma, Pre-Trial Chamber I, in the present 
case, refrained from relying on the elusive concept of dolus eventualis for the mental element in relation to 
the crimes charged and accordingly the decision lacks any discussion on whether the concept of dolus 
eventualis has a place within the framework of Article 30 of the ICC Statute.  n5 Whether Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of the ICC, in its coming decision on the confirmation of charges in the Bemba case, will adhere to the inter-
pretation given to Article 30 by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case or will  [*435]  rule out the no-
tion of dolus eventualis from the ambit of Article 30 is still to be seen.  n6 
This paper examines the different degrees of intentionality under Article 30 of the ICC Statute and 
whether the mental element as provided for in this provision encompasses the triplet forms of dolus, namely, 
dolus directus of the first and second degree and dolus eventualis. The paper concludes that dolus eventu-
alis is one of the genuine and independent pillars of criminal responsibility that forms, on its own, the basis of 
intentional crimes, and suggests its inclusion in the legal standard of Article 30 of the ICC Statute. 
 
2. BACKGROUND ON THE LUBANGA AND KATANGA DECISIONS 
 
On January 29, 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) of the ICC rendered its decision confirming the charges 
against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.  n7 According to the Prosecution, Lubanga was the leader of the Union des 
Patriots Congolais (UPC)--later renamed Union des Patriots Congolais/Reconciliation (UPC/RP)--and a 
commander in chief of its armed military wing, the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (the 
FPLC). Lubanga, the first accused to appear before the ICC, was charged under the relevant articles of the 
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ICC Statute with the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into an 
armed group--the FPLC--and using them actively in hostilities.  n8 As for the form of criminal responsibility, 
the Prosecution charged Lubanga under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute, which covers the notion of direct 
perpetration, co-perpetration, and indirect perpetration (see Chart No. 1 below). In examining the concept of 
co-perpetration, as embodied in the ICC Statute, PTC I devoted a lengthy discussion regarding the mens rea 
standards under Article 30 of the Statute. This will be examined and discussed in the following sections of 
this paper. 
 
 [*436]   Chart 1 
On September 26, 2008, PTC I of the ICC confirmed all but three of the charges against Germain Ka-
tanga, a DRC national, alleged commander of the Force de resistance patriotique en Ituri (Patriotic Resis-
tance Force in Ituri/FRPI), and Matthieu Ngudjolo Chui, a DRC national, alleged leader of the Front des na-
tionalistes et integrationnistes (Nationalist Integrationist Front /FNI). The Chamber confirmed seven counts of 
war crimes and three counts of crimes against humanity.  n9 The PTC I analyzed principal responsibility un-
der Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute based on the Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges. 
As regards the mental elements, the Chamber held that the persons must be aware of the factual cir-
cumstances enabling them to exercise control over the crime through another person, such as the character 
of the organization, their authority within the organization, and the factual circumstances enabling 
near-automatic compliance with their orders.  n10 
 [*437]  In examining the subjective elements of the war crime of pillaging, the PTC I stated: "The intent 
and knowledge requirement of article 30 of the Statute applies to the war crime of pillaging under Article 
8(2)(b)(xvi). This offence encompasses first and foremost, cases of dolus directus of the first degree. It may 
also include dolus directus of the second degree."  n11 The PTC I found both dolus directus of the first and 
second degree sufficient to trigger the criminal responsibility for most of the crimes charged.  n12 When it 
comes to the elusive concept of dolus eventualis the Chamber cautiously abstained from entering into any 
discussion regarding this standard of mens rea, stating that "there is no need for the present Decision to 
discuss whether the concept of dolus eventualis has a place within the framework of article 30 of the ICC 
Statute because the Chamber will not rely on this concept for the mental element in relation to the crimes 
charged."  n13 Not surprisingly, the Defense for the first accused (Katanga) requested leave to appeal the 
Pre-Trial Chamber's Decision on the Confirmation of Charges.  n14 The third issue for which leave to appeal 
has been requested relates to the PTC I distinction between the notion of dolus directus of the second de-
gree and dolus eventualis, and the fourth pertains to the Chamber's approach not to entertain the question of 
whether or not the notion of dolus eventualis is part of the general subjective element provided for in Article 
30 of the ICC Statute.  n15 The Defense contended that the introduction of dolus eventualis through the back 
door may have an impact on the ultimate issue of guilt and that the doctrine of dolus directus of the second 
degree should be given a correct interpretation.  n16 
 
 [*438]  3. THE MEANING OF INTENT AND KNOWLEDGE UNDER ARTICLE 30 OF THE ICC STATUTE 
 
In order to hold a person criminally responsible and liable for a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC, it must 
be established that the material elements of the offense were committed with intent and knowledge. This is 
the plain meaning of the first paragraph of Article 30 of the ICC Statute: "Unless otherwise provided, a per-
son shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court 
only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge."  n17 
The term "intent" as set out in Article 30 has two different meanings, depending upon whether the mate-
rial element relates to conduct or consequence. A person has intent in relation to conduct, if he "means to 
engage in the conduct,"  n18 whereas in relation to consequence, a person is said to have intent if "that per-
son means to cause that consequence" or "is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events."  n19 
 
3.1. Direct intent or dolus directus of the first degree 
 
In the Lubanga case, the first test ever of Article 30, PTC I of the ICC asserted that the reference to "inten-
tion" and "knowledge" in a conjunctive way requires the existence of a "volitional element" on the part of the 
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suspect.  n20 This volitional element refers first to situations in which the suspect (i) knows that his acts or 
omissions will materialize the material elements of the crime at issue and (ii) undertakes these acts or omis-
sions with the concrete intention to bring about the material elements of the crime. According to the PTC I, 
the above-mentioned scenario requires that the suspect possess a level of intent that it called dolus directus 
of the first degree.  n21 
This form of intent is equivalent to the Model Penal Code culpability term "purposely." Section 2.02 of the 
Model Penal Code considers a person acts "purposely" with regard to a result if it is his conscious object to  
[*439]  cause such result.  n22 In United States v. Bailey et al., the Supreme Court ruled that a "person who 
causes a particular result is said to act purposefully if he consciously desires that result, whatever the likeli-
hood of that result happening from his conduct."  n23 Absicht, or dolus directus of first degree, in German 
criminal law is also identical to "direct intent" as defined in Article 30(2)(b) of the ICC Statute. Absicht is de-
fined as a "purpose bound will."  n24 In this type of intent, the actor's will is directed toward the accomplish-
ment of that result.  n25 
 
3.2. Indirect intent, oblique intent, or dolus directus of the second degree 
 
Article 30(2)(b) of the ICC Statute assigns a second alternative of intent with regard to the consequence 
element, providing that even if the perpetrator does not intend the proscribed result to occur, he is consid-
ered to intend that result if he "is aware that [the consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events."  
n26 In the Lubanga case the PTC I asserted that Article 30 encompasses other aspects of dolus, namely dolus 
directus of the second degree.  n27 This type of dolus arises in situations in which the suspect, without having 
the actual intent to bring about the material elements of the crime at issue, is aware that such elements will 
be the necessary outcome of his actions or omissions.  n28 
This degree of mens rea is akin to "knowledge" or "awareness" rather than intent stricto sensu. This po-
sition is supported by the definition given to knowledge in paragraph 3 of Article 30: "[f]or the purpose of this 
article, 'knowledge' means awareness that . . . a consequence will occur in the  [*440]  ordinary course of 
events." The essence of the narrow distinction between acting intentionally and acting knowingly with regard 
to the consequence element is the presence or absence of a positive desire or purpose to cause that con-
sequence. 
The plain meaning of Article 30(2) makes it clear that once the prosecution demonstrates that an ac-
cused, in carrying out his conduct, was aware that the proscribed consequence would occur, unless extraor-
dinary circumstances intervened, he is said to have intended that consequence. Thus, a soldier who aims to 
destroy a building, while not wishing to kill civilians who he knows are in the building, is said to intend the 
killing of the civilians (Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the ICC Statute) if the building is in fact destroyed and the civilians 
are killed.  n29 Yet according to the plain meaning of paragraph 2(b) of Article 30, a result foreseen as virtu-
ally certain is an intended result and there is no need to prove a volitional element on the part of the ac-
cused.  n30 Such an interpretation would run contrary to the plain meaning of the chapeau element of Article 
30 of the ICC Statute according to which individual criminal responsibility for serious crimes over which the 
Court has jurisdiction requires proof of both cognitive and volitional elements. In addition, the evolutionary 
developments of the law of mens rea in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals demand that for the impo-
sition of criminal responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law both cognitive and voli-
tional component must be incorporated in the legal standard.  n31 
 
4. IS THERE ROOM FOR DOLUS EVENTUALIS UNDER ARTICLE 30 OF THE ICC STATUTE? 
 
While some legal scholars view the second alternative of intent as excluding concepts of dolus eventualis or 
recklessness,  n32 others advocate the  [*441]  inclusion of recklessness and dolus eventualis in the legal 
standard of Article 30.  n33 
Professor Otto Triffterer has suggested that since Article 30(2)(b) explicitly states "will occur" and not 
"might occur," it would not be enough to prove that the perpetrator is aware of the probability of the conse-
quence and nevertheless carries out the conduct that results in the proscribed  [*442]  consequence.  n34 
Rather, the prosecution must demonstrate that the perpetrator foresees the consequence of his conduct as 
being certain unless extraordinary circumstances intervene.  n35 Professor Kai Ambos in his observations on 
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the Bemba confirmation decision emphasized that the interpretation of the notion of dolus eventualis by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber "is by no means the only one" and that "there are other more cognitive concepts of dolus 
eventualis requiring awareness or certainty as to the consequence" and "these may indeed be included in 
Article 30."  n36 
 
4.1. Incorporating dolus eventualis in Article 30 by the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber 
 
In the Lubanga case, PTC I of the ICC asserted that the insertion of "intent" and "knowledge" in a conjunctive 
way, as set out in Article 30, requires proof of the existence of a "volitional element" as well as a cognitive 
element on the part of the suspect.  n37 Aware that the jurisprudence of the two ad hoc Tribunals has recog-
nized other degrees of culpable mental states than that of direct intent (dolus directus of the first degree) and 
indirect intent (dolus directus of the second degree),  n38 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber went further, assuring 
that the volitional element mentioned above also encompasses other aspects of dolus, namely dolus eventu-
alis.  n39 According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, dolus eventualis applies in situations in which the suspect "(a) 
is aware of the risk that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, 
and (b) accepts  [*443]  such an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or consenting to it."  n40 
The Pre-Trial Chamber found it necessary to distinguish between two types of scenarios regarding the de-
gree of probability of the occurrence of the consequence from which intent can be inferred: 
 
Firstly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is substantial (that is, 
there is a likelihood that it "will occur in the ordinary course of events"), the fact that the suspect 
accepts the idea of bringing about the objective elements of the crime can be inferred from: 
(i) the awareness by the suspect of the substantial likelihood that his or her actions or omis-
sions would result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime; and 
(ii) the decision by the suspect to carry out his or her actions or omissions despite such 
awareness. 
Secondly, if the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is low, the sus-
pect must have clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may result 
from his or her actions or omissions.  n41 
It is obvious that the degree of awareness in element (i) of the above quoted judgment, awareness of 
substantial likelihood, does not reach the standard of knowledge as set out in Article 30(3) of the ICC, 
awareness that a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events (virtual certainty), and accordingly 
is not sufficient to trigger the criminal responsibility for crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court. Perhaps for 
that reason the Chamber made it clear that a volitional element, element (ii), is required in addition to the 
cognitive element, element (i), and that both elements constitute the requisite components of the notion of 
dolus eventualis. 
The Chamber went further, asserting that 
 
in situations where the suspect's mental state falls short of accepting that the objective ele-
ments of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, such a state of mind cannot 
qualify as a truly intentional realisation of the objective elements, and hence would not meet the 
'intent and knowledge' requirement embodied in article 30 of the Statute.  n42 
 [*444]  As for the exclusion of the concept of recklessness from the realm of Article 30 of the ICC Stat-
ute, the PTC I had this to say: 
The concept of recklessness requires only that the perpetrator be aware of the existence of 
a risk that the objective elements of the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, 
but does not require that he or she reconcile himself or herself with the result. In so far as 
recklessness does not require the suspect to reconcile himself or herself with the causation of 
the objective elements of the crime as a result of his or her actions or omissions, it is not part of 
the concept of intention.  n43 
 
Whether the approach adopted by the PTC I, the inclusion of dolus eventualis under the realm of Article 30 
of the ICC, is supported by the travaux preparatoires of Article 30 is the first stage of our inquiry. 
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4.2. Do the travaux preparatoires support the inclusion of dolus eventualis in Article 30? 
 
4.2.1. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
 
By its resolution 49/53 of December 1994, the General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court.  n44 Pursuant to that resolution, the Ad Hoc Committee dur-
ing April and August 1995 conducted a review of the major substantive and administrative issues arising out 
of the draft statute for an international criminal court prepared by the Commission in its forty-sixth session.  
n45 As far as substantive issues were concerned, many delegations expressed support for the idea of inclu-
sion in the Statute of provisions on general principles of criminal law, including provisions on mens rea.  n46 
 
 [*445]  4.2.2. The Siracusa Draft 
 
In June 1995, a committee of experts, acting in their individual capacity, assembled at the International Insti-
tute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (ISISC) in Siracusa with the purpose of contributing an alternative 
and supplemental text to the International Law Commission's 1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court.  n47 On July 15, 1995, the so-called 'Siracusa Draft' was presented to the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. On March 15, 1996, an updated version of the Siracusa 
Draft (Updated Siracusa Draft) was presented to the Preparatory Committee.  n48 Part three of the Siracusa 
Draft, entitled "Jurisdiction and Substantive Crimes," drew attention to the fact that in drafting the "Special 
Part" for a statute of the International Criminal Court two methodological approaches can be followed. The 
first is to refer to the crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court by name and not to define 
them.  n49 The second approach is "to define the crimes with some degree of specificity, leaving room, how-
ever, for jurisprudential development by the Court."  n50 According to the Siracusa Draft, the former approach 
"has the potential of violating the principles of legality in international criminal law and in many legal sys-
tems," whereas the latter can satisfy the principles of legality if the following conditions are met: 
 
the Statute's definitions [of the four crimes in question] are clear, unambiguous and sufficient as 
to inform a potential violator of the prohibited conduct, and of the nature and extent of the 
criminal charges he would face; and to provide the legal basis upon which the Court . . . can 
adjudicate the accused's guilt or innocence.  n51 
As for the General Part, it was contended that Article 33 of the Commission's 1994 draft Code (Applica-
ble Law) should not be interpreted  [*446]  to permit the Court to substitute the laws of any nation for a 
proper general part of an applicable substantive criminal law.  n52 Yet, the Siracusa Draft suggested the in-
clusion of a general provision, Article 33-7, on the mental element, which states: "Unless otherwise provided 
for, crimes under this Statute are punishable only if committed with knowledge or intent, whether general or 
specific or as the substantive crime in question may specify."  n53 Hence, either knowledge or intent is suffi-
cient to trigger the criminal responsibility for individuals under this draft provision. 
 
4.2.3. The Freiburg Draft of 1996 
 
In the same manner, the 1996 Freiburg Draft prepared by a working group of the Siracusa Committee pre-
sented a general rule on mens rea.  n54 The working group made two fundamental proposals: first, that 
"criminal responsibility [for international crimes] cannot be based on strict liability," and secondly that "unless 
provided for otherwise, [international crimes] are punishable only if committed intentionally."  n55 
 
4.2.4. The 1996 Report of the Preparatory Committee 
 
In its resolution 50/46 of December 11, 1995, the General Assembly decided to set up a preparatory com-
mittee for the establishment of an international criminal court. By resolution 51/207 of December 17, 1996, 
the General Assembly reaffirmed the mandate of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), and decided that it 
should continue its meetings during 1997 and 1998 in order to complete the drafting of a widely acceptable 
consolidated text of a convention, to be submitted to the diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries. During its 
meetings at the United Nations Headquarters in 1996, there was general agreement among the delegations 
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that the crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court "should be  [*447]  defined with clarity, 
precision and specificity required for criminal law in accordance with the principle of legality (nullum crimen 
sine lege)."  n56 In discussing issues related to substantive criminal law, several delegations held the view 
that it would be more useful to include in the Statute an explicit provision on the mental element "since there 
could be no responsibility unless mens rea was proved."  n57 The distinction between general and specific 
intention was considered useless, "because any specific intent should be included as one of the elements of 
the definition of the crime."  n58 Other culpability levels such as recklessness and gross negligence were 
subject to different views as to whether these standards of mens rea should be included in the Statute.  n59 
Motives were seen as being relevant at the sentencing stage, rather than a constituent element of a crime.  
n60 The 1996 PrepCom's report includes three different proposals regarding the mens rea of crimes, which 
read as follows: 
Article H 
Mens Rea 
Mental elements of crime 
 
Proposal 1 
 
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person is only criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime under this Statute if the physical elements are committed with intent [or] [and] 
knowledge [, whether general or specific or as the substantive crime in question may specify].  
n61 
2. For the purpose of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, a person has intent where: 
 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the act or omission; 
 [*448]  (b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that con-
sequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
 
3. For the purpose of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, "know", "knowingly" or 
"knowledge" means: 
 
(a) To be aware that a circumstance exits or a consequence will occur; or 
(b) [To be aware that there is a substantial likelihood that a circumstance exits 
and deliberately to avoid taking steps to confirm whether that circumstances ex-
its][to be wilfully blind to the fact that a circumstance exits or that a consequence 
will occur.]  n62 
 
4. For the purpose of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, where this Statute provides 
that a crime may be committed recklessly, a person is reckless with respect to a circumstance 
or a consequence if: 
 
(a) the person is aware of a risk that the circumstance exits or that the conse-
quence will occur; 
(b) the person is aware that the risk is highly unreasonable to take; 
[and] 
[(c) the person is indifferent to the possibility that the circumstance exits or that 
the consequence will occur.]  n63 
This proposal includes a note that reads as follows: 
 
[Note. The concepts of recklessness and dolus eventualis should be further considered in view 
of the seriousness of the crimes considered. Therefore, paragraph 4 would provide a definition 
of "recklessness", to be used only where the Statute explicitly provides that a specific crime or 
element may be committed recklessly. In all situations, the general rule, as stated in paragraph 
1, is that crimes must be committed intentionally and knowingly. It was questioned whether fur-
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ther clarification might be required to the above definitions of the various types and levels of 
mental elements. It was noted that this could occur either in the General Part, in the provisions 
defining crimes or in an annex. It was questioned whether it was necessary in paragraph 1 to 
make reference to general and specific intent, as in either case the general rule would be that 
intent or knowledge is required. Likewise it was noted that any reference to "motive" should not 
be included; if relevant, motive or purpose would be an integral element of the definition of a 
crime.] 
 
 [*449]  Proposal 2 
 
At the time of a conduct, if a person is not aware of the facts constituting an offence, such 
conduct is not punishable. 
 
Proposal 3 
Moral element 
 
There cannot be a crime without the intention to commit it.  n64 
Proposal 1, as set out in article H of the 1996 PrepCom's report, was adopted by the Committee at its 
February 1997 session with a footnote that reads "[a] view was expressed to the effect that there was no 
reason for rejecting the concept of commission of an offence also through negligence, in which case the of-
fender shall be liable only when so prescribed by the statute."  n65 
 
4.2.5. The Zutphen Draft Statute, January 1998 
 
Proposal 1 of the 1996 PrepCom was also adopted by a Working Group who participated at the interses-
sional meeting that took place in Zutphen,  n66 with a nota bene that reads "[t]he inclusion of the notion of 
recklessness should be re-examined in view of the definition of crimes."  n67 
 
 [*450]  4.2.6. PrepCom Draft Statute, April 1998 
 
At its sixtieth meeting, on April 3, 1998, the PrepCom adopted the text of a draft statute on the establishment 
of an international criminal court,  n68 and the draft final act.  n69 Article 29 of the draft statute for an interna-
tional criminal court, entitled "Mens rea (mental elements)," reproduces the text of proposal 1 of article H of 
the 1996 PrepCom report.  n70 A set of 116 draft articles with a preamble prepared by the PrepCom were 
submitted to the Diplomatic Conference.  n71 
 
4.2.7. The Committee of the Whole 
 
At the Committee of the Whole's first meeting  n72 on June 16, 1998, Mr. Saland of Sweden, introducing part 
3 of the draft statute, entitled "General principles of criminal law," suggested the adoption of article 29 as it 
stood in the PrepCom's 1998 draft statute. Saland recommended the deletion of paragraph 4 "since it pro-
posed a definition of 'recklessness'--a concept which appeared nowhere else in the Statute and was there-
fore superfluous."  n73 At its ninth meeting, the Chairman stated that the Committee of the Whole agreed to 
the deletion of paragraph 4 of article 29.  n74 During the Committee's twenty-fifth meeting, the delegation of 
Azerbaijan expressed  [*451]  their concerns regarding the terminology used in the Statute. They noted that 
adjectives such as "wilfully," "intentionally," and "knowingly" were used interchangeably, whereas each term 
should have its own meaning.  n75 
 
4.2.8. The Preparatory Committee 
 
At its sixtieth meeting, on April 3, 1998, the Preparatory Committee adopted the text of a draft statute on the 
establishment of an international criminal court and the draft final act.  n76 The former contains a general pro-
vision on the mental element of crimes: 
Article 29 
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Mens rea (mental elements) 
 
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person is only criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime under this Statute if the physical elements are committed with intent and knowledge. 
2. For the purpose of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, a person has intent where: 
 
(a) in relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the act [or omission]; 
(b) in relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. 
 
3. For the purpose of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, "know", "knowingly" or 
"knowledge" means to be aware that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur. 
4. For the purpose of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, where this Statute provides 
that a crime may be committed recklessly, a person is reckless with respect to a circumstances 
or a consequence if: 
 
(a) the person is aware of a risk that the circumstance exists or that the conse-
quence will occur; 
(b) the person is aware that the risk is highly unreasonable to take; 
[and] 
[(c) the person is indifferent to the possibility that the circumstance exists or that 
the consequence will occur.]  n77 
 [*452]  N.B. The inclusion of the notion of recklessness should be re-examined in view of 
the definition of crimes.  n78 
Based on the travaux preparatoires of Article 30 of the ICC Statute, it is obvious that the notion of dolus 
eventualis was last discussed in the 1996 Report of the Preparatory Committee and since then had vanished 
from all the subsequent reports and Statute drafts. As noted by Ambos, while the travaux preparatoires con-
firm a restrictive approach as to Article 30 of the ICC Statute, "they are only a supplementary means of inter-
pretation and thus not decisive in the light of a clear or different literal interpretation."  n79 He asserted that 
"the literal interpretation, in turn, is predicated on the conceptual understanding of dolus eventualis" and that 
there are several cognitive concepts of dolus eventualis requiring awareness or certainty as to the conse-
quence and these may indeed be included in Article 30.  n80 
There are a number of questions that remain unresolved: Could dolus eventualis substitute intent under 
Article 30 of the ICC Statute? Since intent under Article 30 means actual knowledge, and since this standard 
of knowledge can by itself trigger the criminal responsibility for intentional crimes under the ICC Statute, is it 
possible for dolus eventualis to play the same role? While the knowledge standard under this concept does 
not reach virtual certainty, it does include a volitional element of acceptance. What are the contours of dolus 
eventualis? 
 
5. THE CONTOURS OF DOLUS EVENTUALIS IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
5.1. Egypt 
 
The Egyptian Penal Code does not set general principles for dolus eventualis, except when it tackles the 
accomplice liability in Article 43 of the penal code, which stipulates: "A person who participates in a crime 
shall bear its penalty, even though the resulting crime is not the one he has initially intended, so long the 
crime that actually took place is a probable result of his instigation, agreement, or assistance." 
 [*453]  On December 25, 1930, the Egyptian Court of Cassation issued a judgment that stirred many 
scholars' debates given its difference from the conventional opinion widely adopted by the jurisprudence and 
judiciary in France in viewing dolus eventualis.  n81 It rather adopted the idea of "acceptance" as an essential 
element in the concept. The Egyptian Court of Cassation decided that 
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(1) dolus eventualis substitutes intent, in the strict sense of the word, in establishing the ele-
ment of intentionality. It can only be defined as a secondary uncertain intention on the part of 
the perpetrator who expects that his act may go beyond the purpose intended to realize an-
other purpose that was not intended initially but nevertheless performs the act and thus appre-
ciates the unintended purpose. As a result of this intention, it becomes irrelevant whether the 
consequence takes place or not. 
 
(2) The purpose of formulating the definition in this way is to clarify that intention must be pre-
sent in all circumstances, to include all forms of such intention and to exclude other cases 
where the intention is not established, in a bid to calling for caution in order not to confuse 
premeditation with mere error. 
 
(3) The key issue for deciding if dolus eventualis is established or not is to ask the following 
question: while undertaking the intended act, did the perpetrator want to do it even if this act 
goes beyond its original purpose to perform another criminal consequence that actually hap-
pened and was not originally intended? If the answer is in the affirmative, dolus eventualis is 
established. If the answer is negative, then the whole matter is nothing more than an error that 
may be punishable or not depending on whether the conditions establishing an error are pre-
sent. 
 
(4) Based on the above, dolus eventualis is not established in the following scenario: X intends 
to kill Y by poisoning a piece of sweets and offering it to Y. Y keeps the piece of sweets that Z 
finds, eats and accordingly dies. In this case, the accused shall be punished for the attempted 
murder of Y and shall not be punished for killing Z under the pretext of dolus eventualis. This is 
because the secondary intention is not established; only the focused intention is established, 
and that is fulfilling the original purpose and it does not go beyond to any other criminal pur-
pose.  n82 
 [*454]  In his treatise on Dolus Eventualis, Professor Abou el Magd Aly Eisa found that dolus eventu-
alis is one of the genuine and independent pillars of criminal responsibility that forms, on its own, the basis of 
intentional crime.  n83 In the words of Eisa: 
 
[Dolus eventualis] is the same as the direct criminal intent as they share the same nature and 
essence. Both are based on the same elements, namely will and knowledge. Knowledge in the 
dolus eventualis is mixed with suspicion and hence it takes the form of inconclusive expectation 
of the criminal consequence. Will, on the other hand, appears in its weakest form represented 
in the perpetrator's acceptance of the consequence or his indifference towards it. In fact, indif-
ference towards the criminal consequence means in reality--as we see it--accepting this con-
sequence and reconciling oneself with it. The expectation on which the dolus eventualis is 
based on is the actual expectation that can not be substituted by its probability or necessity or 
both; otherwise it would be subsumed under unintentional errors. In addition, the criterion gov-
erning the dolus eventualis is a subjective criterion; in other words, the expected consequence 
is the one anticipated by the perpetrator according to his own perspective upon attempting to 
commit the crime even if his perspective was counter to the reality.  n84 
Professor Mohamed Mohie el-Din Awad differentiates between the probable or likely consequence from 
dolus eventualis. He considers the former a crime that goes beyond the perpetrator's intent.  n85 He views 
dolus eventualis as requiring both expectation and acceptance on the part of the defendant: "[I]f the perpe-
trator expects the consequence and regards it equal whether it happens or not though he hopes it would not 
happen, but he accepts its occurrence for this is better to him than not perpetrating or discontinuing the 
crime, the perpetrator shall be held responsible."  n86 Both scholars are of the opinion that there is no basis 
for holding the perpetrator responsible for the probable or likely consequence of his act within the dolus 
eventualis theory.  n87 
 
 [*455]  5.2. France 
 
Page 11 
12 New Crim. L. R. 433, * 
In France, neither statute nor case law provides any general definition of intention, and it has been left to 
academics to analyze its meaning.  n88 In French criminal law, a distinction is made between two forms of 
intent, namely, dol general and dol special. The term dol in French criminal law means the deliberate inten-
tion to commit a wrong and involves both "knowledge" that something is prohibited and the "deliberate will-
ingness" to carry out the proscribed conduct. The classic definition of dol general is provided by Emel Gar-
con, the eminent nineteenth century legal scholar: "L'intention, dans son sens juridique, est la volonte de 
commettre le delit tel qu'il est determine par la loi; c'est la conscience, chez le coupable, d'enfreindre les 
prohibitions legales . . . According to Garcon, dol general encompassed two mental elements: la conscience 
(awareness) and la volonte (willingness/desire). This definition of dol general was accepted by subsequent 
French legal scholars. The element of conscience, in French criminal law, simply refers to the accused's 
knowledge that he or she is breaking the law. With regard to the element of "desire," it is interpreted as sim-
ply referring to the accused's willingness to commit the wrongful act and not the desire to accomplish the re-
sult of the act in question. 
French law also recognizes two other forms of dol, namely, dol direct, where the forbidden conduct or the 
prohibited consequence is desired, and dol indirect, where according to Professor Jean Pradel: 
 
the agent knows that his voluntary act will cause (certainly or almost certainly) a consequence 
that is not truly desired. Our case law without saying so expressly, accepts this notion and as-
similates dol indirect and dol direct; so a murder may exist by reason of the knowledge that the 
blows could result in death as well as in the desire to produce the precise result, which is the 
extinction of a life.  n89 
French writers also recognize the concept of dol eventuel, which is where the defendant merely foresees 
the possibility of the result but he or she  [*456]  does not desire its occurrence. However, this form of dol 
does not amount to dol special and hence is not a mental state that will support a conviction for meurtre, 
whether in its simple form or one of its aggravated forms.  n90 Under the new French Criminal Code,  n91 
however, dol eventuel may amount to a lesser fault and it is treated as an aggravating factor in relation to 
involuntary murder and nonfatal offenses against the person.  n92 It can also constitute an offense under Arti-
cle 223-1 of the new Criminal Code.  n93 
 
5.3. Italy 
 
Dolus eventualis is recognized under the Italian criminal law as dolo eventuale. Pursuant to Article 43 of the 
Italian Codice Penale, all serious crimes require proof of the mental element known as dolo, which means 
that the prohibited result must be both preveduto (foreseen) and voluto (wanted). Yet, a result may be voluto 
even though it is not desired if, having contemplated the possibility of bringing it about by pursuing a course 
of conduct, the perpetrator is prepared to run the risk of doing so (dolo eventuale). Even a small risk may be 
voluto if the defendant has reconciled himself to or accepted it as a part of the price he was prepared to pay 
to secure his objective.  n94 
Article 43 of the Italian Penal Code recognizes what is termed preterintenzione, a form of constructive 
intention whereby a person who intends to produce one outcome is deemed to have intended a more serious 
outcome even if he cannot be proved to have realized the risk of that serious  [*457]  outcome.  n95 This is 
known in French criminal law as dol depasse where the result that is caused goes beyond the intention and 
foresight of the defendant.  n96 In Egyptian criminal law it is also known as al-garima al-mota'adyet el-qasd. 
 
5.4. South Africa 
 
In South African criminal law, an amalgam of Roman-Dutch and English law, fault may take two broad forms, 
namely, intention (dolus) or negligence (culpa). Intention is divided into four standards, namely, dolus direc-
tus, dolus indirectus, dolus eventualis, and dolus indeterminatus.  n97 All forms of intention are assessed 
subjectively and dolus eventualis is a sufficient form of mens rea for all crimes based on intention.  n98 A clear 
statement on the definition of intention is given in the Draft Criminal Code of South Africa: 
 
A person has intention to bring about a result of his conduct if 
(a) it is his aim to bring about the result [dolus directus]; 
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(b) he knows that his conduct would of necessity bring about the result [dolus indirectus]; 
(c) he foresees the possibility of the result flowing from his conduct and reconciles himself to 
this possibility [dolus eventualis]. 
In a recent judgment, Van Aardt v. The State,  n99 the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa reached 
a verdict of murder upon proof of dolus eventualis on the part of the accused. The Court refers to Holmes' 
observation on the mens rea requisite for murder in the case of S v. Sigwahla:  n100 
 
1. The expression "intention to kill" does not, in law, necessarily require that the accused 
should have applied his will to compassing the death of the deceased. It is sufficient if the ac-
cused subjectively foresaw the  [*458]  possibility of his act causing death and was reckless of 
such result. This form of intention is known as dolus eventualis, as distinct from dolus directus. 
2. The fact that objectively the accused ought reasonably have foreseen such possibility is not 
sufficient. The distinction must be observed between what actually went on in the mind of the 
accused and what would have gone on in the mind of a bonus paterfamilias in the position of 
the accused. In other words, the distinction between subjective foresight and objective fore-
seeability must not become blurred. The factum probandum is dolus, not culpa. These two dif-
ferent concepts never coincide. 
3. Subjective foresight, like any other factual issue, may be proved by inference. To constitute 
proof beyond reasonable doubt the inference must be the only one which can reasonably be 
drawn. It cannot be so drawn if there is a reasonable possibility that subjectively the accused 
did not foresee, even if he ought reasonably to have done so, and even if he probably did do 
so.  n101 
 
5.5. Germany 
 
In the German legal system dolus eventualis occurs in situations in which the offender does not aim for the 
materialization of the elements of the offense or does not foresee the fulfilment of the elements as virtually 
certain but he or she considers it to be possible.  n102 
German literature, as well as courts, treated dolus eventualis differently according to various theories. As 
noted by Professor Michael Bohlander: 
 
"they range from theories that decline to entertain, to differing degrees, any volitional element 
for example from the mere awareness of a possibility of the result occurring, to its probability, 
the requirement that D must envisage an unreasonable risk, or a manifestation of avoidance 
efforts, to those that require a volitional element, again to differing degrees, such as the ap-
proval theories which make the mental consent of the offender to the result, should it occur, the 
decisive parameter, to those that let an attitude of reckless indifference suffice, in other words if 
D says 'I could not care less.'"  n103 
 
 [*459]  What is common to all of them is that the defendant "must have been aware of the fact that his ac-
tions may lead to an offence being committed."  n104 
The following are some of the theories propounded by academic commentators and courts. 
 
5.5.1 The Consent and Approval Theory 
 
This theory is applied by the courts,  n105 and is usually referred to as the "theory on consent and approval" 
(Einwilligungs--und Billigungstheorie).  n106 The majority of German legal scholars who subscribe to this the-
ory use a slightly different definition for dolus eventualis. They are of the opinion that the offender must "se-
riously consider" (ernstnehmen) the result's occurrence and must "accept the fact" that his conduct could 
fulfill the legal elements of the offence.  n107 Another way of putting the point is to say the offender must "rec-
oncile himself" (sich abfinden) to the prohibited result.  n108 If, to the contrary, the offender is "confident" (ver-
trauen) and has reason to believe that the result--though he foresees it as a possibility--will not occur, he 
lacks dolus eventualis and acts only negligently.  n109 
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The prevailing opinions, as well as the courts' view, show that in the case of dolus eventualis, both 
knowledge and wilfulness must be present. As for the requisite component of knowledge, however, it is suffi-
cient that the offender foresee the consequences as possible; as for the component of wilfulness, the of-
fender has to approve the result or reconcile himself to the result. The BGH went on drawing the lines be-
tween bedingter Vorsatz or dolus eventualis and bewusster Fahrlassigkeit or conscious negligence, assuring 
that the perpetrator who trusts in the non-occurrence of the undesired result is merely acting with conscious 
negligence and not with dolus eventualis.  n110 
 
 [*460]  5.5.2 The 'Indifference Theory (Gleichgultigkeitstheorie) 
 
According to the indifference theory, the volitional element of dolus eventualis is present if the offender is 
indifferent to the occurrence of the result that he foresees as possible.  n111 This theory could be seen as 
similar to the "consent and approval" theory. In the Leather Belt Case,  n112 however, the application of the 
indifference theory would lead to the acquittal of the defendants as far as murder (intentional killing) is con-
cerned. This is because the defendants were not indifferent to the death of the victim O; to the contrary, the 
death of O was highly undesired. 
 
5.5.3 The Possibility Theory 
 
The possibility theory requires that the offender recognize a substantial or a considerable possibility that the 
result could materialize.  n113 In other words, if the defendant foresees or recognizes the result as "concretely 
possible," he acts with dolus eventualis.  n114 The upholders of the possibility theory argue that the envisaged 
possibility of a prohibited result as such should have halted the offender from acting. If he still decides to act, 
he should be punished for intentional conduct. Hence, pursuant to the possibility theory, Vorsatz cannot be 
understood as acting with both knowledge  [*461]  and wilfulness. Rather, it eliminates the volitional com-
ponent. However, it is doubtful whether the volitional element is dispensable. Firstly, Vorsatz should com-
prise two components, an intellectual and a volitional component. Secondly, according to this theory, there 
are no border lines to be drawn between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence. The following case will 
illustrate this matter: 
 
X is driving his car on a country road. In spite of low visibility due to fog, he overtakes a truck. 
While doing so he is fully aware that his overtaking is grossly contrary to road traffic regulations 
as well as daredevil and perilous. Despite his awareness of the risk, X seriously trusts in his 
conduct not resulting in accident. However, when overtaking he causes a serious traffic acci-
dent in which an oncoming motorcyclist is killed. Did X commit manslaughter?  n115 
According to the possibility theory, X is seen to have possessed the intent to kill (dolus eventualis) since 
he has realized the possibility of the result's occurrence.  n116 X had seriously trusted the nonoccurrence of 
the result (the death of another person), and thus had not accepted this fatal result, he is still considered to 
possess the intent to kill (dolus eventualis) according to the possibility theory. 
 
5.5.4 The Probability Theory 
 
Unlike the possibility theory, the probability theory requires awareness of a higher degree of risk--the defen-
dant must have considered the prohibited result to be likely and probable.  n117 According to this theory, an 
offender acts with dolus eventualis if he foresees that the occurrence of the prohibited result is probable.  n118 
The probability theory excludes the volitional element as an essential component of Vorsatz and is therefore 
subject to the same criticism as the possibility theory. The probability theory has also been criticized for using 
a very vague criterion. "Probable" is defined to be "more than possible, but less than predominantly  [*462]  
probable."  n119 The definition reveals its vagueness; nevertheless, the probability theory would lead to the 
same conclusion adopted by the BGH in the Leather Belt Case. 
Having discussed some of the theories related to the notion of dolus eventualis it is worth noting that 
German courts, following the tradition of the Reichsgericht and the jurisprudence of the BGH, "adhere to a 
somewhat watered-down approval theory, yet the approval does not need to be explicit and the offender 
need not morally approve of the result--it is sufficient if he or she accepts it nevertheless in order to reach his 
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or her ulterior goal."  n120 Most notably in the more recent case law, German courts have put strong emphasis 
on distinguishing between the essence of the cognitive and volitional elements and inferring their existence 
from the evidence about the external conduct of the defendant.  n121 The Federal Supreme Court has 
adopted the approach that if the defendant "is acting in an objectively highly dangerous situation and still 
goes ahead with his or her plans without being able to claim realistically that nothing bad will happen, the 
volitional element may be more easily inferred than in less clear-cut situations, where the danger is not read-
ily recognisable."  n122 
In light of the aforementioned, we might conclude that in the German legal system acting with dolus 
eventualis requires that the perpetrator perceive the occurrence of the criminal result as possible and not 
completely remote, and that he endorses it or at least makes peace with the likelihood of it for the sake of the 
desired goal. In the case of extremely dangerous, violent acts, it is obvious that the perpetrator takes into 
account the possibility of the victim's death and, since he continues to carry out the act, he is prepared to 
accept such a result. The volitional element (acceptance) denotes the border line between dolus eventualis 
and advertent or conscious negligence. 
 
5.6. Islamic Jurisprudence 
 
Islamic tradition, like other major religious traditions, does not consist of, or derive from, a single source. 
Sharia is based on a variety of sources.  [*463]  These sources are categorized by Muslim scholars into 
primary and supplementary sources.  n123 The Koran is the fundamental and original source of the Sharia; the 
Sunna is considered the second primary source and as such is next in importance to the Koran.  n124 After 
the Prophet's death (632 C.E.), the need for a continuing process of interpretation of the Koran became more 
acute.  n125 This led to the development of supplemental sources of law to apply whenever the two primary 
sources were silent on a given question.  n126 Ijtihad  n127 (independent interpretation) was needed to answer 
new questions--and new issues that necessitated new thought and laws--resulting from the expansion of Is-
lam into new societies and cultures. This exercise of ijtihad during the eighth and ninth centuries led to the 
development of four schools of jurisprudence: the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Shafai, and the Hanbali. They were 
named respectively after the four founders and are followed today by the vast majority of Sunni Muslims.  n128 
Although Muslim jurists did not identify a theory for dolus eventualis, they mentioned the hypotheses 
that, if united, specified, and formulated, would establish one of the most up-to-date theories of that notion. In 
his treatise Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Jurisprudence, Professor Ahmad Fathy Bahnasy quoted vari-
ous views of Muslim jurists where conditional intent or dolus eventualis was deemed sufficient to hold a per-
son criminally liable for intentional crimes.  n129 Thus, for example, we read in Al  [*464]  Mughni: "If some-
one deliberately creates a hole in a ship loaded with people--an act which usually sinks a ship--and if those 
aboard the ship die in it because they are in a deep sea or because they cannot swim, retaliation shall be 
imposed on that person. He shall further compensate for the ship, what it carries in terms of money and peo-
ple." 
The established jurisprudence of the Supreme Federal Court of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recog-
nizes different degrees of mental states other than the one of actual intent, or, using the language of 
Lubanga PTC I, dolus directus of the first degree, to trigger the criminal responsibility of intentional crimes. 
Most notably the UAE adheres to Malik's school of thought according to which in murder cases it is not a 
condition sine qua non to prove the intent of murder on the part of the defendant; it is sufficient, however, to 
prove that the act was carried out with the purpose of assault and not for the purpose of amusement or disci-
pline. A practical example is set forth in one of al-Maliki's jurisprudence sources: if two people fought inten-
tionally and one of them was killed, retaliation should be imposed on the person who survived.  n130 
 
6. DISTINGUISHING DOLUS EVENTUALIS FROM DOLUS DIRECTUS OF THE SECOND DEGREE 
 
Based on the above survey one can conclude that in dolus directus of the second degree there must be a 
correlation between the desired consequence (dolus directus of the first degree) and the pertinent conse-
quence (dolus directus of the second degree). This correlation is inevitable, indispensable, and imperative 
and must always exist; consequently, this type of intent was termed an intent of imperative consequences.  
n131 Yet, if we were faced with a result that was an inevitable and indispensable consequence of the first, 
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where the occurrence of the first would mean a definite occurrence of the second, then, for the second result, 
this will be considered as a dolus directus of the second degree.  n132 
 [*465]  On the other hand, if the second consequence, sequential to the first, was expected by the 
perpetrator to potentially ensue, then, even under the highest degree, we would be faced with dolus eventu-
alis.  n133 In other words, if the second consequence had multiple probabilities where its occurrence as a 
consequence of the first was questionable, with the assumption that the perpetrator was not surprised by it in 
the event it did occur, then this will be considered as dolus eventualis. 
In terms of legal value, there exists no difference between both types of dolus directus, of the first and 
second degree; intentionality is present in both.  n134 Parity between both types is justified by the fact that the 
direction of a will toward an incident is imperatively a direction toward any act known to be indispensably re-
lated thereto.  n135 Moreover, there is no difference in terms of legal value between both types of dolus direc-
tus and dolus eventualis on which premeditated crimes are based by reason of existence of both the poten-
tial contemplation of the consequence, though rather nonabsolute, and the acceptance of its occurrence. 
These two factors are considered the elements of criminal intent in its general form as well as of direct and 
indirect intent (dolus directus of the first and second degree) represented in the cognitive element (knowl-
edge/awareness) and the volitional element (will or acceptance).  n136 
 
7. A PROPOSED DEFINITION FOR DOLUS EVENTUALIS 
 
Since criminal intent is generally defined as the perpetrator's "knowledge" of the elements of the crime as 
prescribed by law and his "will" to implement those elements, and based on the definition given to that notion 
by the Egyptian Court of Cassation in its ruling in case no. 1835 (judicial year 47), discussed above, Profes-
sor Eisa proposed the following definition for dolus eventualis: 
 
It is a form of criminal intent which satisfies the threshold for the mental element of intentional 
crimes. It is an unfocused intent that occurs when the perpetrator foresees the possibility that 
the consequence of his act exceeds  [*466]  the goal he intended--whether legitimate or ille-
gitimate--to another unlawful goal which he did not intend initially, and nevertheless performs 
the act, reconciling himself with the consequences.  n137 
Professor Eisa went further, clarifying each element of his proposed definition for the notion of dolus 
eventualis: 
 
(a) Describing it as "intent" means that the element of will has supreme importance in its forma-
tion while calling it "unfocused" is intended to distinguish between this type of intent and dolus 
directus, which is focused directly upon implementing the illegitimate consequence. 
(b) Saying that it "occurs to the perpetrator" refers to the fact that this intent was not originally 
leading to the criminal consequence that resulted from his act; 
(c) The statement "foresees the possibility that the consequence of his act exceeds the gaol he 
intended . . ." is meant to show that it is important to be a realistic foresight and hence it cannot 
be replaced by a possible or necessary foresight. This also shows the importance of realistic 
foresight as a basis for intention. In addition, the statement refers to the fact that it is a subjec-
tive foresight as the focus is on the perpetrator's personality when performing his act. It should 
not also be conclusive or inevitable while it can be only possible. This is considered an accu-
rate definition of the criterion and amount of the foresight required to build the concept of dolus 
eventualis. 
(d) Describing the original act as "legitimate or illegitimate" is meant to confirm the independ-
ence of dolus eventualis as well as the fact that it does not need to be preceded by another 
criminal intent in order to have a predetermined crime. 
(e) The statement "to another unlawful goal which he did not intend initially, and nevertheless 
performs the act" confirms the reliance on what revolves in the perpetrator's mind concerning 
his attitude toward the criminal consequence that may result from the act. 
(f) The expression "reconciling himself with the consequences or paying no heed whether those 
consequences occur or do not occur" is meant to highlight that we favor the theory of consent 
which is considered a crucial element for establishing dolus eventualis on the part of the ac-
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cused. Failing to prove this element of acceptance makes the act no longer intentional; it may 
however be considered mistaken conduct.  n138 
 
 [*467]  8. A PLEA TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
Based on this survey it is evident that dolus eventualis is a form of intent that has its distinctive identity. It is 
considered the basis of the mental element in intentional crimes, which stands independently from any other 
criminal intent that precedes or supports it. The perpetrator's intent may be legitimate at the beginning, but 
then he foresees that his act may result in an illegitimate consequence that he reconciles himself to because 
of some ulterior motive. 
In order not to undervalue people's lives and interests, particularly in contemporary armed conflicts 
where civilians and their properties become the main targets, and in order to guarantee that patterns of be-
havior are legitimate and consistent with the social norms, it becomes inevitable to adopt the concept of do-
lus eventualis as the basis of intentional crimes under the ICC Statute, particularly in cases where there is 
clear evidence from which the Court can infer the perpetrator's acceptance of the illegitimate consequences 
of his act or his underestimation of the gravity of such consequences. Hence, dolus eventualis should not be 
regarded in the same manner as unintentional errors, which differ in their nature, method, and essence.  n139 
As for estimating the sentence of the perpetrator who commits his crime based on dolus eventualis, 
since the will in this type of intent is not as strong as in dolus directus, and since the punishment should 
range from strong to weak according to the gravity of the crime, the honorable judges of the International 
Criminal Court may use their discretionary power accorded to them by the Statute. 
Adopting the concept of dolus eventualis puts things on the right track and acknowledges criminal re-
sponsibility based on the accurate balance between guilt and punishment, so each degree of guilt has a cor-
responding punishment. This guarantees that justice among people prevails. 
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